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BOOK REVIEWS 251 
(Mill's tyrannical majority it would seem), might well incline us to hold out 
for moral constraints on politics, on law, even if they be of the thick, no 
doubt objectionable, Lockean kind. 
An Essay on Divine Authority by Mark C. Murphy. Cornell Studies in the 
Philosophy of Religion, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2002, 197 pages. 
GARY MAR, Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University 
Mark Murphy's An Essay on Divine Authority is a new and original work 
in the distinguished Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion edited 
by William Alston. The new Problem of Divine Authority is that of (1) 
answering whether God has practical authority over created rational 
beings, and (2) providing an explanation of the extent of that authority. 
Why has this problem been unduly neglected? 
Philosophers have failed to see the Problem of Divine Authority, accord-
ing to Murphy, because they have been blinded by widely held philosophi-
cal assumptions. On the one hand, philosophers who assume that "it is a 
platitude that God is authoritative" regard the thesis as tautological like 
'bachelors are unmarried' and hence trivially true. On the other hand, 
philosophers who regard Euthyphro's dilemma as decisive against Divine 
Command ethics, assume that the dilemma refutes the Divine authority 
thesis. Both assumptions, Murphy argues, are unwarranted. Euthyphro's 
dilemma is directed against normative Divine Command theories of ethics 
that postulate God's authority as a supreme moral principle; however, the 
defender of Divine Authority is not committed to such a view. Moreover, 
even the truism 'all bachelors are unmarried' becomes an open question 
when regarded as "a de rc question, a question about why these particular 
bachelors are unmarried." The Problem of Divine Authority is not so easi-
Iv dismissed. 
~ Murphy's examination depends on distinguished between the objective 
claim of God's being the supreme authority and the subjective claim of 
God's being practically authoritative for me. Practical authority, according to 
Murphy's explication, is a relationship in which the dictates of one party 
(e.g., God) gives another party (e.g., a creative rational being) a decisive rea-
son for action. The reason for action is a fact that must be complete (it 
includes" all that makes an action choiceworthy") and compact (it includes 
only those facts that are, at least in part, constitutive of choiceworthiness). 
Given the infinity of God's good-making attributes and the finitude of creat-
ed rational beings, however, one wonders whether the requirement of com-
pleteness could be fulfilled in principle, let alone be required for rationality. 
Moreover, God's having causal control over an agent's actions does 
not imply that God is practically authoritative. For God to be practically 
authoritative over an agent, Murphy explains, God's telling agent x to 
perform an action cp must "constitutively actualize" a reason for x to cp, 
namely, a reason, which if undefeated, is decisive. Explaining just how 
God's dictates might constitutively actualize a reason leads Murphy to 
articulate three grades of Divine Authority. 
252 Faith and Philosophy 
Let 'Cx' abbreviate 'x is a created rational being' and 'Gx' abbreviate 
'God has practical authority over x,' which is analyzed as 'for any action qJ, 
God's telling x to qJ constitutively actualizes a decisive reason for x to qJ.' 
Using this notation, we can succinctly formalize three Strong Authority 
Theses (SATs): 
Strong Thesis: 
Stronger Thesis: 
Strongest Thesis: 
't;/x(Cx--Gx) 
't;/ x(Cx--OGx) 
o (x)(Cx--Gx) 
The Strong Authority Thesis is the claim that God has universal practical 
authority over all created rational beings. The Stronger Thesis says that all 
created rational beings are essentially under God's practical authority, and 
the Strongest Thesis says it is a necessarily true that all created rational 
beings are under God's practical authority. (Note that there are even 
stronger theses than Murphy's 'Strongest', e.g., o't;/x(Cx--OGx), or 'it is a 
necessary truth that all created rational beings are essentially under God's 
practical authority.') It turns out that all three of the SATs fail. 
This result is not surprising. The standard modal reading of the 
'Stronger Thesis', for example, only requires that all actual creative rational 
beings are necessarily under God's practically authority, but leaves it open 
whether some possible created rational being need not be under God's prac-
tical authority. However, the critical issue is whether God's dictating an 
action could, by itself, constitute a decisive reason for a created rational 
being to perform that action. Murphy finds this troublesome and so con-
siders a close relative of the strong authority theses. The 'Compliance 
Thesis' does not require that God's dictates themselves constitute reasons 
for compliance, but only that God has some reasons and hence that created 
rational beings are acting irrationally if they fail to comply with God's dic-
tates. This substitute thesis, Murphy argues, captures what is plausible 
about the SATs without the implication that God's authoritativeness deci-
sively demands compliance just because God so dictates. 
In subsequent chapters, Murphy argues that Perfect Being Theology 
gives us no reason to affirm the SATs, that neither metaethical nor norma-
tive Divine Command ethics gives us any reason to hold the SATs, and 
that there are no convincing moral arguments for the SATs. With regard to 
Orthodox Christianity, none of the scriptural truths that God is worthy of 
worship, that God is King over Israel, or that God is sovereign over all cre-
ation requires the SATs. Murphy, moreover, is not satisfied to recommend 
skepticism: he claims that rationalism demands that "we ought not merely 
to withhold belief in any of the authority theses; we ought, rather, to disbe-
lieve them." 
While admiring the intellectual virtuosity of the Murphy's analyses, 
readers may find Murphy's solution to the Problem of Divine Authority 
disingenuous. Murphy admits that while God has authority over all cre-
ation "loosely speaking", God "strictly speaking" does not have authority 
over all created rational beings, but only those human beings who have 
submitted themselves to divine authority and "to make God authoritative 
over him or over her." Here Murphy concedes, "I am proceeding largely 
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on the basis of an argument from ignorance, I do not know of any way for 
us to come under divine authority except through submission to divine 
rule, and I am proceeding on the assumption there are no other ways." 
Murphy gives two specifically Christian applications of his solution. 
Murphy endorses a natural law approach to ethics and explains in detail 
why the arguments of Grisez and Finnis, the foremost advocates of natural 
law, fail to show the intrinsic immorality of homosexual conduct. 
Murphy's solution is that, on the basis of God's authoritativeness, the 
Christian can rationally affirm that homosexual conduct is categorically 
wrong even without having the support of natural law. Murphy also says 
rus solution explains why Christians, but not non-Christians, are bound to 
God's command to "love thy neighbor". Having submitted themselves to 
God's authority, "Christians are ... under a weighty moral burden that 
persons generally are not, one that requires them to sacrifice their own 
good in ways that most of us would not choose to sacrifice if it were up to 
us." Scripture's more winsome portrayal is that believers are transformed 
into a "new creation" (2 Cor. 5:5) with a "ministry of reconciliation" (v. 18) 
that is an outworking of God's purpose of "reconciling the world to him-
self in Christ" (v. 19). Jesus' command "take my yoke upon you ... 
[because] my yoke is easy and my burden is light" rughlights the contrast 
between Murphy's non-authoritative abstract conception of divine dictates 
with the incamational authoritativeness of God's revealed Word. 
Identifying himself as a Roman Catholic, Murphy nevertheless claims 
that his general arguments about Divine authority "do not appeal to claims 
about God that are affirmed by Christianity but denied by either of the 
other Abramic faiths" and "could easily be addressed to those whose con-
ception of God is that of Judaism or Islam as to those who conception is 
that of Christianity." Could Murphy be mistaken in assuming that nothing 
is lost in reasoning about the monotheistic concept of the God of Abraham, 
Jesus, and Mohammed? 
Recall that Murphy argued that even the truism that I all bachelors are 
unmarried' is an open question when considered a de re question. 
Similarly, de re truths about God opens up possibilities not available to 
purely de dicta reasoning about the God of philosophical theism. Even if 
one could create counterexamples to support the claim that the concept of 
God does not imply that God is practically authoritative over created ratio-
nal beings, this would not preclude that God is authoritative. One could 
argue by analogy, for example, that godly parents (objectively) have author-
ity over their children even if the children are too young (subjectively) to 
articulate their reasons for obeying the dictates of their parents. Similarly, 
why couldn't God in fact be authoritative (objectively) whether or not, creat-
ed rational beings could (subjectively) articulate a complete, compact, and 
constitutively actualizing reason for obedience? Such considerations might 
lead one to criticize Murphy's treatment of the Problem of Divine 
Authority as too subjective. 
Although this marks a contemplative tum, I want to suggest on the con-
trary, that contemporary analytic philosophy of religion may suffer from a 
poverty of subjectivity-the failure to articulate in their analyses the author-
itative dimensions of religious experience. Thomas Merton wisely 
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observed, "[T]he subjectivity essential to love does not detract from objec-
tive reality but adds to it. Love brings us into relationship with an objec-
tively existing reality, but because it is love it is able to bridge the gap 
between subject and object and commune in the subjectivity of the one loved. 
Only love can effect this kind of union and give this kind of knowledge-
by-identity with the beloved .... " ("The Power and Meaning of Love," in 
Disputed Questions, Farrar, Straus and Giroux: NY, 1976, p. 103.) 
Murphy's book is an original and rigorous exercise in articulating a 
newly defined Problem of Divine Authority. If contemporary analytic 
philosophers of religion are to make progress on this important prob-
lem, perhaps in addition to delighting in the deployment of the technol-
ogy of logical and modal reasoning, we need also to consider exploring, 
more contemplatively, the compelling and authoritative dimensions of 
loving God. 
Metapher und Lebenswelt Hans Blumenbergs Metaphorologie als 
Lebenswelthermeneutik und ihr religionsphiinomenologischer Horizont, by 
Philipp Stoellger. Tubingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2000. XVI + 583 pp. 
99.00 Euros. 
DOUGLAS HEDLEY, Clare College, Cambridge University 
This rich and learned book is not for the faint hearted. It contains 583 pages 
of densely (but beautifully) printed reflection upon the thought of German 
philosopher Hans Blumenberg'S theological sources and theological rele-
vance. It is well worth the effort--one can glean many insights and profit 
from the immense learning of this book: a splendid attempt to analyse the 
philosophical significance of one of the most interesting twentieth century 
German philosophers, Hans Blumenberg. Blumenberg has stimulated 
much discussion on particular issues, but this is an attempt to interpret his 
CEuvre as a whole and to reflect upon its theological ramifications. 
Stoellger's thesis is that theology deals with the metaphors of religious lan-
guage, and Blumenberg can help articulate the theological project. 
Stoellger's choice is prima facie surprising. Blumenberg was not a theolo-
gian and in many ways as a philosopher he was, though not hostile to 
Christianity, convinced that modem culture and philosophy ought to extri-
cate and emanicipate itself from the Christian legacy-as indeed the title of 
his most famous work, The Legitimacy of Modernity, suggests. Stoellger, 
however, endeavours to demonstrate that Blumenberg is a rich resource 
for theology in moving away from a 'Logik des Begriffs,' i.e., a rigidly con-
ceptual logic, to a Metaphorologie', i.e. a logic of metaphors within a 
hermeneutical phenomenology of the experienced world. 
Stoellger's fine book is a detailed analysis of the major works of 
Blumenberg from his early theological work to his final work on Bach's St. 
Matthew Passion. We also find detailed and illuminating discussions of 
Vico, Ricoeur, Derrida and Jungel, as well as Hick and Aristotle. Stoellger's 
discussion of metaphor and symbol is incisive and informed by a striking 
